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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine means to incorporate the environmental effects of fossil fuel use into 
national accounts and genuine savings estimates. The main focus is on the rationales for the 
inclusion of carbon dioxide, and its appropriate price tag. We do this in the context of the pricing of 
historic carbon emissions in United Kingdom over the long run (from the onset of the industrial 
revolution to the present). Furthermore, we examine the reasonableness of taking into account other 
greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide. The global effects of carbon dioxide are compared to the 
local detrimental effects of the production and consumption of coal in the UK. 
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Introduction 
Conventional measures of national income and wealth can provide misleading signals about long-
run economic possibilities of a country (Vincent 2001). To correct for this, various methods for 
Green (or Greened) National Accounting extend conventional national product measures to take 
account of the depletion of natural resources and the deterioration of environmental functions (Daly 
& Cobb 1989, Repetto et al. 1989, United Nations 1993/2003).  
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One major challenge is to take into account the various effects from the use of fossil fuels. 
Depletion costs are perhaps the most straightforward and will not be further discussed within this 
paper (see World Bank, 2011). The environmental costs of the use of fossil fuels, on the other hand, 
take various scales both in time and space affecting both human health and vital environmental 
services. In other words, pollution from fossil fuels has both flow and cumulative effects, and has 
effects on a local, regional and global scale.  
 
Furthermore, some of the effects are captured by other measures in the accounts, which cause a 
danger of double accounting. For example, Kirk Hamilton and Michael Clemens (1999, 341) argue 
that: “The effects of pollution on output (damaged crops, lost production owing to morbidity) are 
usually not broken out explicitly, but because they are reflected implicitly in the standard national 
accounts, there is no need to adjust savings measures in this regard.”  
 
In other words, we do not have to worry about valuing damages which are priced by markets, only 
those not reflected in market prices. In the end, the only pollutant Hamilton and Clemens consider 
in their genuine savings estimate is carbon dioxide. As a measure of the global marginal social cost 
of a metric ton of carbon they assume a constant $20 in 1990, taken from Fankhauser (1994). They 
charge global damages on the assumption that the property right to a clean environment lies with 
the pollute: “for example, we are assuming that the Comoros Islands have the right not be inundated 
as a result of CO2 emissions elsewhere” (Hamilton and Clemens 1999, 342). They provide no 
further rationale for including damage caused by carbon; neither does the subsequent Manual for 
Calculating Adjusted Net Savings (Bolt, Matete and Clemens, 2002). This manual suggests using a 
$20 constant damage in 1995 for CO2, deflated for other years using the U.S.A GDP deflator. 
 
Neither Hamilton and Clemens (1999) nor Bolt, Matete and Clemens (2002) provides any rationale 
for using a constant damage for CO2 as well as for the assumed price tag for this damage. This 
paper will provide further rationales for the inclusion of carbon dioxide, furthermore, will critically 
assess the constant damage function used and the appropriate price tag. We do this in the context of 
the pricing of historic carbon emissions in United Kingdom over the long run (from the onset of the 
industrial revolution to the present). Furthermore, we examine the reasonableness of taking into 
account other greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide. 
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Bolt, Matete and Clemens (2002) argues that ideally, the numbers subtracted from national “assets” 
would reflect marginal damages from the entire range of air pollutants emitted. As a first 
approximation they use, however, only the damage from carbon dioxide emissions. Following their 
advice, since 2003, the World Development Indicators –report also subtracts the damage costs of 
particulates in the air, calculated as willingness to pay to avoid mortality attributable to particulate 
emissions (World Bank 2003, 177). Here carbon dioxide represents emissions with global effects, 
while the effects of particulate matters are local. Damage from particulate matter is, however, only 
reported from 1990 onwards. In this paper, we are able to compare the global and local effects from 
the use of coal in the UK from the onset of the industrial revolution using an insightful dataset 
compiled by Fouquet (2011). This comparison gives new insights on how to include the local and 
global effects of fossil fuel use into the national accounts. 
 
Time and space effects 
 
The scale of pollution problems has major implications for national wealth. Some pollutants have 
effects, which are rather more "domestic" than others – for example, particulates impose a cost on 
the citizens of the country that emits them, as happens with low-level ozone from NOx. In many 
cases, however, it is possible to externalize the pollution problem onto neighbor countries, for 
example by building higher smokestacks. Thus, for example, United Kingdom´s emissions of SO2 
pollute lakes in Norway. As long as the Norwegian government is not able to fine the UK for these 
emissions affecting Norway, only the damage costs of the part of the pollution affecting the UK has 
implications for the national wealth of UK. The question here, however, is which damages should a 
country count in its national accounts? We argue that one should only count damages that impact on 
the national well-being of the country doing the accounting. For example, Norway would show the 
cost of acidification from exported UK emissions in its national accounts, but UK would not.
1
  
 
The effect of global emissions, like carbon dioxide, is in a way a combination of the effects of 
domestic and regional emissions. The long delay between emissions and effect make carbon dioxide 
particularly problematic. The initial effect is for the emissions of individual countries to be diluted 
into the major global Commons, showing no visible effects on the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is 
both non-visible and non-toxic. Thus, the noticeable effects of the carbon dioxide emissions of a 
                                                 
1
 See See Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) for a longer discussion on this issue. 
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single country are similar to those of externalized regional emissions, like sulphur dioxide, in the 
short run.  
 
In the long run, however, the combined carbon dioxide emissions of all individual countries are 
problematic, as the concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases exceed critical 
thresholds e.g., 350 parts per million ("ppm") is generally considered a “safe” upper level. The 
often mentioned 450 ppm target is however, more a political compromise between safety and the 
costs of emission reductions. Many cost cost-benefit analyses of emission reduction use an even 
higher concentration. For example, Eyre et al. (1999), Price, Thornton and Nelson (2007), and 
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (2010) assume a doubling of greenhouse 
gases from a preindustrial level to 550 ppm CO2e, which would require a stabilization of CO2-only 
concentrations at around 425–484 ppm. The current level in the atmosphere is, around 392 ppm, thus 
the ‘safe’ level has already been surpassed. The 450 ppm level can still be considered as a moderate 
risk, with the risks increasing at an escalating pace beyond that level. In economic terms, we can 
describe different targets as different levels of risk tolerance from risk-aversion through risk-
tolerance to risk loving. In ethical terms, it can be described as a gamble on the future of future 
generations.  
 
These 350/450 ppm levels could be interpreted as a natural resource, the carrying capacity of the 
atmosphere. If the concentrations are increasing, the level of this resource is decreasing. We have 
less of the resource available regardless of whether we are over or under the assumed safety level. 
More emissions are a disinvestment, as it reduces the room for future emissions. In a similar 
fashion, Partha Dasgupta and Karl-Göran Mäler (2001) argue that when a country adds to the 
atmosphere’s carbon content, it reduces the value of this common property resource. They suggest 
two possibilities to calculate the value of the change in the country’s capital assets: 
- Firstly, to attribute to each country the fraction of Earth’s atmosphere that reflects the 
country’s size relative to the world as a whole, using population as a means of comparison, 
or GNP, or whatever.  
- Secondly, regard the global common as every country’s asset. In that case, the entire cost of 
global warming inflicted by a country would be regarded as that country’s loss.  
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A third way to calculate the cost of climate change for a country would be to estimate only the cost 
caused directly to that country, the costs due to drying climate, more storm damage, etc. in that 
country alone (Ackerman et al. 2008). 
Our main argument in support of the second approach – to regard the global common as every 
country’s asset - is the fact that in the case of a global phenomenon such as human induced climate 
change, there is in the long run no possibility for a single country to isolate itself. Let us briefly 
return to the sulphur dioxide example. Let us assume, by way of example, that Norway would be 
the major source of timber for the UK, and that the forest would be destroyed by acid rain. This 
would have welfare implications if Norway was the only source of timber for the UK. The UK, 
however, could go to Sweden or Finland for new sources of timber of the same quality and price. In 
the case of a global pollutant with global effects, the possibility for such isolation from the effects is 
not possible. There is, for example, no way for a single country to isolate itself from increases in 
food prices as climate change has negative impacts on global food production. Net exporters of 
food might, in the short run, receive some benefits from such developments, but at the expense of 
consumers.  
Countries that are less affected by climate change will also have difficulty isolating themselves 
(except by increasing border control expenditures) from people leaving areas that are becoming 
uninhabitable due to climate change or conflicts induced by climate change. Oli Brown (2008) 
argues that the commonly cited estimate by Myers (2005) of 200 million people displaced by 
climate change by 2050 could ‘easily be exceeded’. Even this estimate would mean a ten-fold 
increase over today’s entire documented refugee and internally displaced populations. Ethically 
speaking, the use of a single damage cost indicates a belief that we are all in the same lifeboat when 
it comes to the long run effects of climate change.  
Our second argument for the global damage approach is practical. Using one single carbon cost per 
ton for all countries, makes international comparisons easier.  
Our argument for the inclusion of the costs of carbon dioxide emissions in national accounts is 
consistent with ideas discussed above: 1) No country will in the long run be able to isolate its 
economy from climate change and the costs it will inflict. 2) Avoiding the worst outcomes of 
climate change will require significant emission reductions worldwide. In the long run, free-riding 
by a single country will not be possible, at least not without potential diplomatic or local 
consequences e.g., consumer boycotts, which would eventually have direct effects on the economy. 
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3) The emission reductions needed are to a great deal cause by past emissions, thus past emissions 
cause costs in the future. 
 
 
Criticism of the constant damage function 
We have three major arguments against using a constant damage function for the emissions of 
carbon dioxide as suggested by Hamilton and Clemens (1999), and Bolt, Matete and Clemens 
(2002). The first one comes from a general feature of stock pollutants. One unit of a stock pollutant 
added to an already large stock is likely to cause a higher damage than a unit emitted under a low 
concentration level.  
 
The second is intuitive; if we accept that the social costs of carbon (SCC) emissions rise as we 
move through time, it seems odd to keep it constant when moving backwards. Price, Thornton and 
Nelson (2007, 9) argue that: ”As time goes on, the damage comes closer, and is discounted less 
heavily; so its present value rises, increasing the SCC." Similarly, as we go back in time, the 
damage is further away, which should also be reflected in the damage cost.  
 
The third argument relies on the claim that human induced climate change was initially a positive 
thing. Ruddiman (2005, see also 2003) claims that: “…Earth should have undergone a large natural 
cooling during the last several thousand years, and that at least a small glaciation would have begun 
several millennia ago had it not been for greenhouse-gas releases from early human activities" (p. 
105). The human activities he refers to are the slow rise CO2 concentrations that started 8,000 years 
ago when humans began to cut and burn forests in China and the rise of methane concentrations that 
began 5,000 years ago when human began to irrigate land for rice farming and tend livestock in 
unprecedented numbers. Ruddiman (2005, 105) further argues, that “…next glaciation is not 
“imminent'; it is overdue.” Indeed, climate scientists at the turn of the 20th century were more 
worried about a new ice age than global warming. For example, Svante Arrhenius wrote in 1908 
that with increased CO2 "…we may hope to enjoy ages with more equable and better climates, 
especially as regards the colder regions of the earth, ages when the Earth will bring forth much 
more abundant crops than at present for the benefit of rapidly propagating mankind." This statement 
is interesting as he is often wrongly mentioned as the first one to warn about global warming. 
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Arrhenius (1896) calculated that a doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere increases global surface 
temperature by an average of five to six degrees Celsius, but he did not consider this a problem.  
 
The first to warn that an increase in the global temperature could be something to worry about was 
Gilbert Plass in 1956: “...the temperature from this cause may be so large in several centuries that it 
will present a serious problem to future generations.” It would take several decades, however, until 
some kind of scientific consensus arose that global warming would be something bad for 
humankind in the long run (Kunnas 2010 & Vanderheiden 2008). Finally, in 1990 the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change stated in its First Assessment Report that the threat of 
climate change was real, and a global treaty was needed to deal with it (IPCC, 2004). As a response 
to this rising awareness, in 1992 a number of countries signed The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which sets an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to 
tackle the challenge posed by climate change (UNFCCC 1992).  
How does this discussion relate to national income accounts and Genuine Savings? As long as 
global warming is; good thing; emissions of greenhouse gases can be seen as an investment towards 
a ‘better climate’, and only thereafter as a disinvestment. The relevant turning point though is not 
the time of the recognition of the fact that global warming might be detrimental for humankind, but 
the ‘actual’ turning point, otherwise ignorance would be regarded as a good thing.  
There are a number of economic papers on this issue, where the ‘good’ aspects: e.g., longer growth 
periods, carbon dioxide fertilization, less need for heating, etc. has been weighted against the 
‘bads’: drought, extreme weathers, more need for air conditioning, etc. For example, Richard S. J. 
Tol (2011) argues that: “Most rich and poor countries benefitted from climate change until 1980, 
but after that the trend is negative for poor countries and positive for rich countries.” The biggest 
positive of climate change in his calculations comes from agriculture, and is entirely due to carbon 
dioxide fertilization, which makes crops grow faster and more water efficient. Frank Ackerman et 
al. (2008, 17), however, argues that recent research has cast doubts on any agricultural benefits of 
climate change: “More realistic, outdoor studies exposing plants to elevated levels of carbon 
dioxide have not always confirmed the optimistic results of earlier greenhouse experiments.”  
Locating the point in time where climate change stops being a good thing and turns into a bad thing 
is, however, not enough. Another question is the long lifetime of greenhouse gases, especially 
carbon dioxide, which means that emission emitted before climate change became bad both in our 
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thoughts and in reality, is still warming the climate. David Archer (2005) suggests 300 years and a 
25 percent tail that lasts forever as the best approximation for the lifetime of fossil-fuel CO2.  
Over the past 200 years oceans have absorbed about a half of total anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
emissions (Sabine et al., 2004). However, not without costs as when carbon dioxide dissolves in 
seawater, it forms a weak acid called carbonic acid. Because of this chemical process, the average 
pH of the oceans has decreased by 0.1 units from pre-industrial levels, and an exponential decrease 
of nearly 0.8 pH unit is forecasted by 2300. This could have major effects on calcifying marine 
biota, such as calcareous plankton and coral reef communities. (Royal Society, 2005; Caldeira and 
Wickett, 2003; Orr et al. 2005). It also means that the global common, the buffer for future 
emissions has been significantly reduced.  
 
Different price tags and their development in time 
If we were to agree that 1980, for example, is the turning point where climate change would be a 
good thing before that date and bad thereafter, then we would have to count three hundred years 
backwards to find the point in time where the emissions of carbon dioxide would not cause any 
damage in the future. In other words, emissions emitted before 1681 would in this case be 
considered harmless. In this case, all the emissions during our time period under scrutiny, starting 
from 1750 would be considered as harmful, and should be deducted. We could then calculate the 
damage of the emissions in any year in a similar fashion to the lifetime labour income approach 
used by Trinh Le et al. (2006), but in this case with the three hundred years lifetime of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere, instead of the considerably shorter lifetime of humans. Thus, the cost of 
the emissions in 1681 would equal its relative share of the climate change the damage in 1981, the 
cost of the emissions in 1682 would equal its relative share of the damage in 1981+1982 and so 
forth. Furthermore, we would need to add the value of the buffer for future emission used-up as half 
of the emissions have been absorbed by the oceans. Thus, we would need the value of the damage 
caused by climate change for each year since the cut off year and 300 years forwards in time.  
As a first approximation we could assume a constant damage cost, as suggested by Hamilton and 
Clemens (1999) and Bolt, Matete and Clemens (2002), and then take into account the change from 
climate change being a ‘’good thing’ into it being a ‘bad thing’ by setting the damage cost of carbon 
dioxide at zero 300 years ago from the turning point and letting it grow to the full value in 300 
years.  
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As mentioned previously, Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and Bolt, Matete and Clemens (2002) use 
the constant marginal social cost of a metric ton of carbon emitted of $20 (12.66 £/tC) in 1995 taken 
from Fankhauser (1994). In 2002 that might have been a reasonable assumption, however, the 
advances in climate science suggest that a twenty year old figure can hardly be supported. It should 
also be noted that Fankhauser actually proposed a cost that rises over time: 20.3 $/tC (12.85 £/tC) 
for 1991—2000, 22.8 $/tC for 2001—2010, 25.3 $/tC for 2011—2020 and 27.8 $/tC for 2021—
2030. In other words, the damage costs are increasing by 2.5 $/tC per decade.
 2
  
A rising estimate over time, also acts to support decreasing costs as we move backwards in time. 
Should we perhaps, deduct the same 2.5 $/tC per decade as we move backwards? This approach 
would make the cost of carbon change sign between 1913 and 1914, giving a negative damage cost 
implying benefits of climate change for carbon in years before that. Considering the different 
timescales of the positive and negative impacts of climate change – the positive effects of global 
warming, e.g., increased agricultural yields that have already been realized, will have been captured 
in the national accounts, however, the negative effects, which are the discounted values of future 
negative impacts, will not. It, therefore, makes sense to set the negative values (positive impacts) to 
zero.  
Alternatively, we could set the damage cost of carbon at zero in 1680 as suggested above, rising to 
20.3 $/tC in 1995. 20.3 $/tC) divided by 315 years gives an 0.0644$/tC increase per year. These 
different back-counting approaches have been depicted in Figure 1 below. The rapidly increasing 
estimates for the years after 2010 are based on the mid year of the estimates of Fankhauser with a 
linear interpolation for the years in-between.  
                                                 
2
 We have converted dollars to pounds by dividing with the 1995 exchange rate 1.58 $/£ (Officer 2011).   
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Figure 1. Carbon cost £/tC (1995 price level) constant vs. Fankhauser with -0.6 £/year 
deduction and going to zero by 1680 
 
A more recent estimate was undertaken by a U.S. government working group (Interagency Working 
Group on Social Cost of Carbon 2010). For the costs in 2010, they produced a wide range of 
estimates ranging from 4.7 to 64.9 $ per metric ton of carbon dioxide (in 2007 dollars). See Table 1 
below. The first three estimates are based on the average social costs of carbon (SCC) across 
models and socio-economic and emission's scenarios at the 5 %, 3 % and 2.5 % discount rates. The 
analysis is based on projected costs and benefits extending 300 years into the future, thus as we can 
see from the table, the discount rate is crucial for the outcome. The fourth value, the 95
th
 percentile, 
is included to represent the higher-than-expected impacts from temperature change further out in 
the tails of the SCC distribution. The central value is the average SCC across models at the 3 
percent discount rate, which is, for example, 21.4 $ per metric ton of carbon dioxide in 2010.  
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1750 1770 1790 1810 1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
Constant 
12.66 £/tC
Fankhauser 
-0.16 
£/year
Fankhauser 
1680=0
£/
tC
 
11 
 
Table 1 Estimate by the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon 2010 
Year 
5 % 3 % 2.5 % 3 % 
Avg.  Avg. Avg. 95
th
 
2010 4.7 21.4 35.1 64.9 
2015 5.7 23.8 38.4 72.8 
2020 6.8 26.3 41.7 80.7 
2025 8.2 29.6 45.9 90.4 
2030 9.7 32.8 50.0 100.0 
2035 11.2 36.0 54.2 109,7 
2040 12.7 39.2 58.4 119.3 
2045 14.2 42.1 61.7 127.8 
2050 15.7 44.9 65.0 136.2 
 
To present this as cost per metric ton of carbon as in Fankhauser, we must divide with 3.67 (the 
molecular weight of CO2 divided by the molecular weight of carbon = 44/12 = 3.67). Thus, we end 
up in a range of 1.3 to 17.7 $ per metric ton of carbon in 2010. The central value would be 5.83 
$/tC. Thus, we produce a lower social cost than those proposed by Fankhauser, despite the gloomier 
prognosis by climate scientists. A partial explanation for this is that the Fankhauser estimate is 
about global costs, and those by the U.S. government working group relate only to the U.S., which 
is estimated to be among the countries with lower than average costs of climate change.  
Furthermore, Ackerman and Stanton (2011) argue that the U.S. government’s estimate omits many 
of the largest risks associated with climate change, and downplays the impact of our current 
emissions on future generations. Their re-analysis explores the effects of uncertainty about climate 
sensitivity, the shape of the damage function, and the discount rate and estimates that costs are 
much higher.. In their worst case scenario, with a high climate sensitivity (the long-term 
temperature increase expected from a doubling of the concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere) and a 1.5 percent discount rate, costs were as high as 893 $ (243 $/tC) in 2010, rising 
to $1,550 (422 $/tC) in 2050. (The 2007 exchange rate is $2 per pound).  
 
Interestingly the Interagency Working Group provides the lowest carbon cost of all the articles 
considered in this paper, while Ackerman and Stanton provide the highest figure, although they are 
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both using the same modified DICE model. This highlights the importance of the assumptions used 
in such models. 
 
A review of the literature on the social cost of carbon, compiled by DEFRA, the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, suggests using, a point estimate for the social cost of carbon 
emissions of £70/tC for policy design in United Kingdom, with an associated sensitivity range 
giving a lower bound of £35 and an upper bound of £140, for emissions in 2000 (Clarkson & Deyes 
2002). They argue that the point estimate should then be raised by £1 for each subsequent year. 
These costs are taken from Eyre et al (1999). Their choice of the Eyre estimates is based on their 
assumption that it is the most sophisticated study to date, as the method used is based on equity 
weighting instead of using individual regions. The weightings are based on both EU and non EU 
figures and removes the problems of eventual underestimation based solely upon US estimates, as 
argued above. 
 
A periodic review of the Defra paper was undertaken in 2005. It suggested using both the shadow 
costs of carbon and social costs of carbon. The social costs of carbon suggested were slightly lower 
than those in the preceeding paper, £56/tC in 2000-2010, increasing by £1.2/tC per year and an 
increasing growth rate thereafter as shown in Table 2 below taken from Watkiss et al. (2005). 
 
Table 2 SCC Values from the Defra 2005 Study 
Year of 
emission 
Central  
guidance 
Lower 
central  
guidance 
Upper 
central  
guidance 
2000 56 35 220 
2010 68 43 270 
2020 81 51 350 
2030 99 62 365 
2040 112 71 410 
2050 143 90 500 
 
Finally, a DEFRA paper published in 2007 suggested using the shadow price of carbon (SPC) 
instead of the social costs of carbon (Price, Thornton and Nelson 2007). The SPC is based on the 
SCC for a given stabilisation goal, but can be adjusted to reflect:  
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- estimates of the marginal abatement cost required to take the world onto the 
stabilisation path. 
- other factors that may affect the UK’s willingness to pay for reductions in carbon 
emissions, such as a political desire to show leadership in tackling climate change.  
“Therefore, whereas the SCC is determined purely by our understanding of the 
damage caused and the way we value it, the SPC can adjust to reflect the policy.” 
 
They conclude that a social cost of carbon consistent with the damage experienced under an 
emission's scenario which leads to stabilization at 550ppm CO2e should be adopted: 
 “The Stern Review calculates that this implies a social cost of carbon of $30/tCO2e in 
2000, equivalent to £19/tCO2e. This is therefore the number we believe should be 
adopted as the basis for a shadow price of carbon (SPC) profile for use in policy and 
investment appraisals across government in the UK. Using the uprating conventions 
set out below [uprated each year by 2 percent a year reflecting the Stern Review’s 
assessment of the rising incremental damage of each unit of carbon as temperatures 
rise], we adopt an SPC in 2007 of £25/tCO2e.” 
 
Table 3: Shadow price of carbon (SPC) £/tCO2e suggested in Defra 2007 
Yea
r 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
SPC 18.6   19.3   20.1   21.2   22.2   23.3   24.3   25.5   26.0   26.5   27.0   27.6    28.1 
All values in 2007 prices except 2000-2006 where the price level is the same as the year 
Based on these different starting points, we can, construct new estimates that allow changes over 
time. In Figure 2, we have set the carbon price in 1680 to zero 1680, and alternatively allowed 
the carbon costs to diminish with the same 3 percent a year, as Eyre et al., use to produce the 
£70/tC suggested in the first Defra report. The Defra estimates have been named by the year of 
the report, to show how the Defra estimates have declined over the years. It should also be noted 
that the 2007 Defra price tag is a ‘shadow price’ instead of a social cost of carbon, as provided 
by the rest of the estimates presented. In practice, however, there is little difference between 
them, as the SPC is based on the SCC. For comparison's sake, we have also included the 12.85 
£/tC constant, which deflated to the 2000 price level as 14.1 £/tC. We can clearly see how all the 
estimates with the 3 percent yearly deduction, drops below this constant by the mid 1940s. The 
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estimates using a carbon price going to zero by 1860, again exhibits a distinctive kink, causing 
some suspicions about the appropriateness of this method. 
 
Figure 2. Carbon cost £/tC (2000 price level) constant vs. Defra 2002, 2005 and 2007 with 3 
percent annual deduction 
This is just a first snapshot of some of the estimates of the costs of carbon dioxide emissions. 
Richard S.J. Tol (2005) gathered 103 estimates from 28 published studies, and combined them to 
form a probability density function. He found the range of estimates strongly right-skewed: the 
mode of all studies combined was $2/tC (1995 US$), the median was $14/tC, the mean $93/tC 
and the 95
th
 percentile $350/tC. He concluded though that: “Using standard assumptions about 
discounting and aggregation, the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions are unlikely 
to exceed $50/tC, and probably much smaller.” Using the 1995 exchange rate of 1.58 $ per £ 
gives 31.6 £/tC for the latest.  
In his most recent paper Tol (2012) used a vote-counting procedure to estimate the probability 
density function of the total economic impact as a parabolic function of global warming. From the 
available 14 estimates of the total impact of climate change, he calculated an expected value of the 
social cost of carbon of approximately $29/tC in 2015, rising 1.99% per year. Counting back with 3 
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% as in the previous example, would give a carbon cost of $18.4/tC in 2000, or 12.1 £/tC.
3
 A 1.99 
percent annual deduction returns $ 21.4/tC in 2000, or 14.1 £/tC. The latter is the same as the 
constant used by Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and Bolt, Matete and Clemens (2002). After that 
point, both decline rapidly below the constant, as can be seen from Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Carbon cost £/tC (2000 price level) constant vs. Tol (2012) with 1.99 and 3 percent 
annual deduction 
 
The importance of the price tag 
Before proceeding to the other costs of the use of fossil fuels, we will take a brief look at the 
importance of the chosen price tag. In Figure 4 below we have multiplied a selection of price tags 
for the cost of carbon with UK emissions of carbon taken from McLaughlin et al. (2012). As we are 
using emission data from the UK, we are omitting the ‘U.S. only’ estimates. The Defra estimates 
have been calculated with 3 percent discounting and for Fankhauser (1994), we have used both a 
price declining to zero by 1860 and a constant yearly deduction of 0.16 £. For Tol (2012), we have 
used both 3 percent and 1.99 discounting. Unsurprisingly, the highest peak costs are with the Defra 
estimates, peaking in 2006 at 11,388 M£, 9,291 M£ and 3,641 million pounds, as their starting price 
                                                 
3
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tags are the highest. The importance of the decision to use a constant or a diminishing cost as we 
move back in time, is shown by the constant price having the fourth highest peak, peaking at 
2,541million £ in 1971, when the UK carbon dioxide emissions where at their highest peak. The 
lowest costs come from the Tol (2012) estimate with a 3 % discount; while the Fankhauser (1994) 
estimate with a yearly 0.16 £ deduction and Tol (2012) with a 1.99 % discount provides trajectories 
closer to each other. 
 
Figure 4. Costs of Carbon emissions, Million £ in 2000 price level, 1750-2010 
It might be more instructive, however, to show the costs of carbon dioxide emissions as a share of 
GDP. That is done in Figure 5, below. This changes the outcome considerably, with the highest 
percentage at the peak with the constant carbon cost of 1.5 percent in 1873. Otherwise the order 
remains affectvely unaltered, with the next highest peaks with Defra 2002 and 2005 assumptions in 
1992 at 1.2 and 1 percent; followed by Fankhauser going to zero by 1860, peaking at 0.96 percent 
in 1908. The rest of the estimates' peak between 0.2 and 0.4 percent of GDP. 
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Figure 5: Carbon costs compared to GDP, 1750-2000 
 
Which carbon cost estimate to use? 
So far, we have shown that there are many alternatives for setting the price tag for carbon dioxide 
emissions in the past, and that the chosen price tag will have a major influence of the costs of 
carbon dioxide emissions in the past. Although no matter what value you use, historic damage costs 
are still very small compared to the GDP. The question of which damage cost estimate and back 
counting method we choose should choose, however, remains unanswered.  
In attempting to answer this question, the first thing we do is drop the ‘U.S. only’ or any country 
specific estimates. Our main argument for this is the fact that in the case of a global phenomenon as 
human induced climate change, there is no possibility for a single country to isolate itself. Using 
one single carbon cost per ton for all countries also makes international comparisons easier. 
Furthermore, Ackerman and Stanton (2011) clearly show that the Interagency Working Group on 
Social Cost of Carbon (2010) estimates omit many of the largest risks associated with climate 
change, and downplays the impact of our current emissions on future generations. Their own worst 
case scenario cost, is used only to illustrate the effects of possible extremely dire consequences of 
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climate change. This is relevant when looking forward, but perhaps not so when looking backwards, 
knowing that historical emissions have not led to any worst-case scenario – yet.  
 
Next, we drop the constant carbon cost. If we accept that the costs of carbon emissions rise when 
moving forwards in time, it feels odd to keep it constant when going backwards. Against estimates 
set going to zero by 1680 or any other years, is the large effect on the assumed year when the 
negative effects of climate change overturn the positive effects. This problem is missing in 
estimates based on a percentual decrease for each year back in time, as they are moving 
asymptotically towards zero. Here the main problem is choosing the ‘right’ percentage.  
Such assumptions as those made above still leave many other options for carbon cost estimates. 
Which if any, of the remaining estimates do we find most support for? Using this approach, we 
would suggest using the Tol’s (2012) estimate. Interestingly, a 1.99 percent annual deduction of 
carbon costs returns $ 21.4/tC in 2000, or 14.1 £/tC which is the same as the constant used by 
Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and Bolt, Matete and Clemens (2002). Furthermore, as the Tol 
estimate itself is a combination of many independent estimates; it can be seen as a good 
compromise between different approaches to calculate the carbon costs.  
Rabl (1996) argues that in the cost benefit perspective of future generations beyond the first 
generation should be discounted at the growth rate of the economy; any discount rate greater than 
the growth rate of the economy used for a sufficiently long time would cause the annual benefit 
becoming larger than the total economy. We argue that this conclusion holds as well when looking 
back into the past, as a particular point in time is the future of a more distant point. This notion 
would support using the rather low discount rate of 1.99 % used by Tol (2012) over the 3 % or 
higher discount rate in most of the other papers discussed. The 1.99 percent rate is close to the 1.8 
percent growth for the UK economy from 1750 to 2000, and slightly below the post war 2 ½ 
percent growth rates.  
An alternative would be to use the GDP growth rate of the economy itself. In an exercise like this, 
focusing on just one country choosing the appropriate discount rate, would not pose any significant 
problems. Choosing the right discount rate in international comparisons can, on the other hand, be 
tricky. Should we use the same discount rate, like the global GDP growth during the period of 
interest, or different discount rates, like the GDP growth rate of each country separately? This 
question will be discussed further in a subsequent paper dealing with international comparisons of 
the effect of the use of fossil fuels.  
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Should we take into account additional greenhouse gases? 
Before proceeding further, we will briefly consider other greenhouse gases. The second most 
important greenhouse gas is methane (CH4) arising from extraction of fossil fuels, cattle, sheep and 
other ruminant livestock, landfills, and rice cultivation. Other important greenhouse gases are 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6). Of all total warming potential of global greenhouse-gas emissions in 2005, CO2 
contributed 77%, methane 14% and nitrous oxide 8% (Stern Review, 170). Richard Eyre et al. 
provide some estimates for the damages of both methane and nitrous oxide. As we can see from 
Table 4, there is again a large variation between the models used and especially the discount rate 
applied. Alternative estimates are provided by C. Hope (2006).  
 
Table 4. Marginal damages of Methane and Nitrous Oxide Emissions in 1995—2005. 
Greenhouse 
gas 
Damage unit Marginal damage from model 
  FUND Open Framework 
  1 % 3 % 1 % 3 % 
Methane €/t 46 19 44 20 
Nitrous Oxide €/t 17 000 6 400 26 000 11 000 
Source: Eyre, Nick et al. (1999) Global Warming Damages. 
 
Methane is approximately 21 times more powerful at warming the atmosphere than carbon dioxide 
(CO2) by weight, but its lifetime in the atmosphere is only approximately 12 years.
4
 Thus, we would 
not need to make or find estimates of methane emissions going very far back in time, only 12 years 
earlier than the estimated turning point when climate change becomes a bad thing. The very same 
short lifetime in the atmosphere of methane speaks, on the other hand, against its inclusion in any 
estimate as we move further back in time. If we believe that climate change before the 1980s did 
not cause any harm, methane emissions prior to the 1970s would not cause any harm either. Thus, it 
would have no relevance for most of the period under investigation. Furthermore, Watkiss et al. 
(2005) argue that, “any extra methane emitted today will have disappeared before the most severe 
climate-change impacts occur.”  
 
                                                 
4
 http://www.epa.gov/outreach/scientific.html 
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The atmospheric lifetime of nitrous oxide is considerably longer than that of methane, 
approximately 120 years and its heat trapping effects are approximately 310 times more powerful 
than carbon dioxide on a per molecule basis.
5
 Arguments against the inclusion of nitrous oxide 
come from the fact that it was responsible for only 8% of the warming potential in 2005, compared 
to the 77% for CO2. When the costs of carbon dioxide emissions were at most, only around one 
percent of GDP, the effect of nitrous oxide would be only around one-tenth of a percent at most. 
Thus, its inclusion would not make much difference. 
 
Local effects of fossil fuels 
So far, we have argued that the social costs of carbon dioxide emissions were, at most, 
approximately one percent of GDP. Adding other greenhouse gases, most notably methane and 
nitrous oxide, would add some tenths of a percent at most. Our next step is to compare these global 
effects to the local effects. For a first approximation, we concentrate on the fuel of the industrial 
revolution – coal. Roger Fouquet (2011) has made a comprehensive estimate of the total external 
costs of coal production and consumption for United Kingdom. Firstly, he estimated the premature 
deaths associated with coal production and local air pollution in the United Kingdom between 1700 
and 2000. The reasons for premature death included local air pollution caused by coal burning, 
deaths from accidents in coal mines and deaths of coal miners from respiratory disease 
(pneumoconiosis). Having estimated the number of deaths, his next step was to place a value on 
them. In other words, he identified the number of years prematurely lost and multiplied this number 
by the value of a life year lost. His results for the period 1750 to 2000 are reported in Figure 6 
below. The costs peaked in 1891, when air pollution from coal was estimated to have caused close 
to £(2000) 17.5 billion in damage, as close to 73,000 people were estimated to have died as a result 
of coal production and consumption. 
                                                 
5
 http://www.epa.gov/nitrousoxide/scientific.html 
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Figure 6. The costs of premature deaths caused by coal production and consumption in UK, 
1750—2000 
Source: Fouquet, R. (2011) "Long Run Trends in Energy-Related External Costs" Ecological 
Economics 70(12) 2380-9. 
 
Again, it might be more instructive to show the costs of coal consumption compared to the GDP 
and this is presented as Figure 7, below. For comparison, we have added the costs of carbon dioxide 
emissions using our price tag choice, that of Tol (2012), with a 1.99 percent annual deduction. The 
local costs due to premature deaths, caused by the production and consumption of coal alone, peaks 
in 1879 at around 18 percent of GDP, while the global cost of carbon dioxide emission's peaks at 
0.3 percent in 1971.
6
 By choosing a higher carbon price estimate, we could have increased that to 
around 1.5 percent, which is still only one-tenth of the local costs. Furthermore, the local costs were 
realized in the year examined, while the global costs are discounted values of future costs. Thus, it 
is no surprise that the former problem is more or less solved, while global warming is still 
proceeding. 
 
                                                 
6
 Note that peak percent is slightly lower than the 20 % in the Ecological Economics article by Roger Fouquet, as he has 
kindly provided us with an updated dataset, and our GDP used differs slightly from his.  
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Figure 7. The costs of premature deaths caused by coal production and consumption in UK 
versus the global costs of UK carbon dioxide emissions, 1750—2000 
 
So could we, and should we include the costs of premature deaths calculated by Roger Fouquet into 
the national accounts of the UK – we believe not as it would cause serious double counting. The 
premature deaths are to some degree included in normal national accounts through the missing work 
contribution, which reduces GDP. Considering the Genuine Savings measure, it could be argued 
that these deaths cause a loss in the value of human capital, if one uses a discounted lifetime 
earnings approach to value human capital. The World Bank Manual for Calculating Adjusted Net 
Savings suggests taking human capital into account through public expenditure on schooling (Bolt, 
Matete and Clemens, 2002). Such information is provided by Vincent Carpentier (2001, 2003 & 
2008). According to his estimates, the public expenditure on education amounted to only 0.01% of 
GDP in 1833, and not until late 1890s would it reach 1 percent. During the same period, the local 
costs of premature deaths due to coal production and consumption varied between 5 and 18 percent. 
Thus, its deduction would cause negative human capital growth for the whole 19
th
 century.  
 
We suggest a different approach to account for the negative effects of local pollution. In general, 
human capital can be calculated via two different approaches: 1) Retrospective (or resource-cost) 
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methods based upon expenditures on education, 2) Prospective methods through the discounted sum 
of the wages the population would receive over the remaining expected number of working years.
7
 
We suggest using the latter method, as air and water pollution and other environmental problems 
enter human capital to the extent that it impacts on people's capacity to work as part of the work 
force. For example, people that have lost their health and working capacity or have met a premature 
death due to environmental pollution are permanently out of the work force.  
 
Estimates of the cost of environmental pollution or degradation proposed by, for example, Roger 
Fouguet (2011), could be used in such an approach to explain changes in human capital. Using a 
counterfactual approach, we could then explore how much larger the human capital would have 
been if this pollution had not had taken place. Through the contribution of human capital on 
economic growth, we can also estimate the effect of pollution on economic growth. Similarly, the 
environmental effects of pollution, for example, acid rain on, buildings and forests also enter 
through depreciation of the capital stock in buildings and forests.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined means by which we might incorporate the environmental effects of 
fossil fuel use into national accounts and Genuine Savings estimates, particularly if we consider 
retrospective and prospective estimates. We started by making a distinction between local, regional 
and global emissions and between stock and flow emissions as each require different approaches. 
Regional emissions that are exported outside the country under scrutiny can be ignored from the 
national accounts as long as the recipient country does not have an effective way of imposing a 
payment from the emitter.  
 
The effect of global emissions such as carbon dioxide, involves a combination of the effects of 
domestic and regional emissions. In the short run, it seems that a single country can isolate itself 
from the detrimental effects of global warming, but in the long all countries are unable to free ride. 
Thus, we support the use of a single global price tag for carbon dioxide emissions worldwide. We 
argue that the price tag should decrease as we move back in time to take into account the fact that 
carbon dioxide is a stock pollutant and the estimates of its future cost are increasing while the 
                                                 
7
 For a nice overview of different approaches to calculate human capital see chapter three in Kokkinen (2012). 
24 
 
possibility that human induced climate change might initially have a positive effect cannot be 
excluded.  
 
A comparison of the local effects in UK, of the production and consumption of coal alone versus 
the effects of carbon dioxide, showed that the former exceeds the latter by at least tenfold in terms 
of its importance relative to GDP. Thus, there is no surprise that the former problem is more or less 
solved, while global warming is still proceeding. We hope that the latter does not become as serious 
as the local effects of coal use, which peaked at approximately twenty percent of GDP, before 
genuine action to solve it is taken. 
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